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I. MORTGAGES-REVOCATORY ACTIONS
The 1984 revisions to the Civil Code amended, among many items, those
articles dealing with the revocatory and oblique actions.' Recently, two cases
have arisen interpreting the scope of the revocatory action. In both, creditors
were trying to annul transfers into trusts and the issue was the peremptive period
applicable to revocatory actions.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2041 provides:
The action of the obligee must be brought within one year from the
time he learned or should have learned of the act, or the result of the
failure to act, of the obligor that the obligee seeks to annul, but never
after three years from the date of that act or result.2
The question raised by the language of Article 2041 is what constitutes
knowledge of the obligee. Can an obligee be subject to a claim that he "should
have learned of the act" merely because it was recorded in the public records,
or is actual knowledge sufficient? Is the test merely knowledge of the transfer
or rather knowledge of the harm caused by the transfer? The two appellate cases
hold, under Article 2041 (which covers both liquidated and unliquidated claims),
that the peremptive period begins to run from the date of the harm, not the date
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of the transfer. The cases note a distinction between the transfer itself and the
harm caused by the transfer.
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Jones3 was an action by a creditor
holding a mortgage who sought to annul a transfer of movable and immovable
assets into a trust that was created after execution of the mortgage. In 1986, the
mortgage was put in place; in 1989 the trust was formed and assets were
transferred into the trust. Seven months later, also in 1989, the lender filed suit
on the promissory note and mortgage and obtained a judgment. Two years later,
in 1991, the lender filed this revocatory action to set aside the transfer into the
trust.
4
The following stipulation was entered into:
[The lender] had actual knowledge of the Trust and its recordation...
more than one year prior to the date on which [the lender] filed this
[revocatory action] lawsuit ... but [the lender] did not discover the
harm created by the transfer and recordation until... less than one year
prior to the date [of the filing of the revocatory action] lawsuit .... 5
The trial judge sustained the debtors' exception of prescription, but the
appellate court reversed and remanded, finding the fact that the public records
reflected the transfer into the trust was not the sole determinative issue. The
appellate court emphasized it was not the recordation itself that could put lenders
on notice of the harm the revocatory action is designed to prevent-the court
reasoned the harm is insolvency and the inability of the creditor to collect the
judgment.6 The court noted that merely because someone may have transferred
property did not demonstrate that the creditor necessarily was harmed at the time
of the transfer.
The trial judge's reliance on the recordation date of the trust instrument
in the public records as the date prescription began to run was clearly
misplaced. While recordation of the trust instrument clearly put future
lenders on notice as to which assets of Horace Lynn Jones, if any, were
available to secure his personal indebtedness, the recordation did no
more than put First Federal on notice of the possibility that it had been
damaged.7
Because the lender did not know of the damage-that is, the inability to
collect the judgment and the increase in the debtor's insolvency-the plaintiff's
inscription of the trust did not start the peremptive clock running.
3. 620 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 3d Cir.). writ denied, 629 So. 2d 347 (1993).
4. Id. at 409-10.
5. Id. at 410.
6. Id. at 411.
7. Id.
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If prescription does not begin merely upon the date of the transfer but upon
the date of knowledge of the harm, when is a creditor engaged in a foreclosure
process knowledgeable of the harm caused by a prior transfer? Several dates
might be looked at: the date of transfer, the date suit is filed, the date judgment
is obtained, the date of the appraisal, or the date of the sheriff's sale. Premier
Bank, N.A. v. Stout8 found the appropriate date to look at was the date of the
sheriff's sale if a deficiency judgment was being sought.
The facts of the Premier Bank case are that, in 1988, the Stouts established
the Stout Family Trust; the trust instrument gave the grantors the right to transfer
and the trustees the right to receive other property into the trust. In 1989, First
Federal, another creditor of the Stouts, filed suit on promissory notes and later
filed a deficiency judgment action. In 1990, Premier Bank filed suit on the
promissory notes it held. Premier Bank claimed it first learned of the trust's
existence during the judgment debtor examination in April, 1991. First Federal-
claimed it first learned of the trust during its review of the transcript of Premier
Bank's judgment debtor examination. The suit to revoke the transfer into trust
was filed within one year of the judgment debtor examination and within three
years of the date of the trust's existence. The trial judge sustained an exception
of prescription.9
The appellate court's ruling had several levels of analysis. First, the
exception of peremption (termed here an exception of "prescription") seeking to
unwind the original $1500 donation to the trust was sustained. Second, the case
was remanded to determine if there were subsequent transfers into the trust.
Third, the exception of "prescription" was overruled on the subsequent transfers
pending further court hearings."0 Relying both upon Jones and on an extensive
review of Planiol's discussion of the Paulian action, the Stout appellate court held
damage did not occur to a secured creditor until the conclusion of the foreclosure
sale, "because this is the earliest date a creditor should know of the damage
sustained by it as a result of the wrongful transfer into the debtor's assets.""
While the original transfer into the trust was felt by the court to be outside
of the peremptive period, the court reasoned subsequent transfers might not be,
because the harm could not be known to the creditor until the time of the
foreclosure sale. If the foreclosure sale brought sufficient funds to pay off the
creditor, then the creditor, reasoned the court, could not be harmed at all by the
transfer because the proceeds of the foreclosure sale would have extinguished the
plaintiff-creditor's debt. On the other hand, if the foreclosure sale did not bring
sufficient funds to pay the foreclosing creditor in full, then it is only at this point,
when the bid price is determined, that the creditor can realize there is a harm.
8. 627 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
9. Id. at 188-89.
10. Id. at 191.
II. Id. at 190. Planiol's discussion of the Paulian action is located at 2 Marcel Planiol &
George Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law §§ 296-336, at 178-96 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans.,
West 1959) (1939).
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Judge Domengeaux expressly pointed out that a creditor who seeks a revocatory
action following a foreclosure sale must be seeking a deficiency judgment; if
there is no deficiency judgment, there is no cause of action to revoke the transfer
because there is no damage.' 2
II. THE PUBLIC RECORDS AND THE NAME OF THE MORTGAGOR
Since the mortgage records are indexed only by the parties' names and not by
property descriptions, the method by which the indeX is maintained plays an
important role in helping third parties determine what mortgages may affect
them. 3 There are actually four distinct steps in placing a mortgage on the public
records. The first step is called filing, and it is the process by which the document
is presented to the Recorder of Mortgages. 4 Filing is accomplished by providing
the document to the clerk at the usual and customary place in the clerk's office
where such filings occur."5 The second step is the assembly of everything that is
filed into a chronologically bound volume. In every parish except Orleans, the
clerk of court is both the recorder of mortgages and the recorder of conveyances.
Therefore, in every parish except Orleans, the originals consist of all documents
filed with the clerk, whether they are ultimately destined for recordation in the
conveyance records or the mortgage records.16 The third step is the process of
creating the index for the mortgage and conveyance records. This is the process by
wfhich employees of the clerk's office read through the document and extract the
names of the mortgagor, mortgagee, vendor, and vendee. These indices are what
one searches when looking for documents in the public records. The fourth and
final step is the process of "recordation," which is the method by which a copy of
the original document is transferred into a special conveyance book or mortgage
book.
In the 1800s, the distinction between filing and recordation was very clear.
The original document was filed; a clerk's employee would then copy the entire
document, in longhand, onto large sheets of paper bound in a special book. There
was a single book for mortgages and a single book for conveyances. Therefore, the
process of rewriting and copying the document into the mortgage or conveyance
book was the process of recordation. Later, typewriters were used, and in the
twentieth century, photocopies, microfiche, and microfilm have been used to create
the conveyance and mortgage books. It can be anticipated that, in the not-too-
12. Premier Bank, N.A., 627 So. 2d at 192 (Domengeaux, J., concurring).
13. La. R.S. 9:2721 (1991 & Supp. 1994) contains the basic rules for the Louisiana Public
Records Doctrine. See also McDuffey v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910).
14. The rules regulating recorders of mortgages and their duties are contained in La. R.S.
9:5141-:5216 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
15. See, e.g., Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v. Leon Boudreaux & Bros., 153 La. 685, 96 So. 532
(1923).
16. The special rules regulating Orleans Parish are contained in La. R.S. 9:5207-:5209, :5215
(Supp. 1994).
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distant future, electronic means of creating the conveyance and mortgage books
will be used. In each instance, however, the mortgage and conveyance books are
distinct from the originals themselves. The originals are filed, but the mortgage and
conveyance books are separate and distinct compilations of the materials which
consist, in one form or another, of copies of the originals.
Louisiana law historically has always distinguished between filing and
recordation. Conveyances were always deemed effective upon filing, even if not
recorded, while mortgages were effective only upon recordation. 7 In an effort to
make the effective date of mortgages the date of filing, the predecessor to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5141 was enacted."t The function of the statute was to try to
make the date of filing the date of the effectiveness of mortgages. The statute,
however, has been interpreted to mean filing is the effective date only if recordation
later occurs in a timely fashion. 9
When the Civil Code provisions on mortgages were revised in the 1990s, an
attempt was made to transform the language of "recordation" to "filing." Other
provisions of the Civil Code, however, have remained unchanged, such as those
articles dealing with privileges, which refer sometimes to "filing," sometimes to
"inscription," and sometimes to "recordation."
20
In light of the inability of third parties to locate documents unless they are
indexed, the indices become all important. Nonetheless, Louisiana courts
uniformly hold filing (and, if necessary, recordation) alone is sufficient to affect
third persons. A document which is not indexed nonetheless affects third
parties.2
17. For an example of the rule concerning conveyances, see Schneidau v. New Orleans Land
Co., 132 La. 264, 61 So. 225 (1913) (on rehearing). The rule concerning mortgages was part of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1921, and was carried forward as an unnumbered statute. See La. Const.
art. XIV, § 16 (1974).
18. La. R.S. 9:5141 (1991 & Supp. 1994) provides:
A. All acts or instruments of writing which import mortgage or privilege, when filed for
record with the recorder of mortgages, shall be immediately indorsed by him with the
date, hour. and minute of filing which indorsement shall be recorded with the registry of
the instrument.
B. All such instruments shall be effective against all persons from the time of their filing.
C. All such instruments filed after December 31, 1991, shall include the Social Security
number or the taxpayer identification number of the mortgagor, whichever is applicable.
Failure to include such numbers shall not affect the validity of the instruments.
D. No clerk of court or recorder of mortgages shall refuse to accept for recordation any
instrument which does not contain the social security number or taxpayer identification
number as prescribed in this Section.
19. Compare Kennibrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp., 244 La. 879, 154 So. 2d 433 (1963) (holding
recordation within three days is sufficient) with Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 9 La. App. 720, 119
So. 770 (Ist Cir. 1929) (holding recordation after eighteen months is insufficient).
20. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 3320 ("A mortgage... is given the effect of recordation when
it is filed ....") with La. Civ. Code art. 3328 (entitled "Duration of inscription; general rule") and
La. Civ. Code art. 3330 ("The effect of recordation of a ... judicial mortgage ceases ten years after
the date of the judgment.").
21. See, e.g., Agurs v. Belcher & Creswell, 1 I La. 378, 35 So. 607 (1903).
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A creditor who files a mortgage is concerned not only about putting third
parties on notice of this encumbrance, but also about finding the existence of
prior encumbrances. This requires a search of the indices; and, since the name
of the mortgagor is the way the indices are kept, an index search requires
looking for specific names. Most cautious attorneys look for variations of the
name, knowing the name is only the first step in the process; it is only by review
of the actual document that one can determine whether the -specific property is
encumbered (in a conventional mortgage) or whether the person named in the
index is a mortgagor under a legal or judicial mortgage.
It is in this context that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2728 was enacted
concerning conventional mortgages:
A conventional or collateral mortgage shall not be deemed inferior and
subordinate to another security device solely by reason of:
(1) its inclusion of or failure to contain the middle name or initial of
the mortgagor; or
(2) the use of any reasonable variation of the mortgagor's name,
including but not limited to initials or abbreviations for the mortgagors'
given names.
The purpose of the statute was to legislatively overrule First Financial Bank,
FSB v. Johnson,22 a case which held a mortgage in the name of "James
Johnson" did not affect property purchased in the name of "James J. Johnson,"
so as to outrank later creditors who used this name for the mortgagor, although
the purchaser and mortgagor were one in the same. Confusing the concept of
a conveyance certificate with a title search, 3 the court held the mortgageholder
"had the duty of properly styling the name of its. mortgagee in the act of
mortgage. '24 First Financial Bank, FSB stands in stark isolation; the same
appellate court later restricted the case's ruling to prospective effect only.2
Furthermore, given both that it was overruled legislatively in 1987 by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:2728, and that no other court has cited it with approval, First
Financial Bank, FSB is destined to be relegated to an historical footnote.
There is a tension, however, that First Financial Bank, FSB brings to the
fore and that merits discussion. When no property description is required to
create the mortgage, as is the case with a legal or.judicial mortgage,26 the
22. 477 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
23. A conveyance certificate is merely a request to the clerk of court to check for a specific
name in the conveyance records; a mortgage certificate is the same request to be run in the mortgage
indices. This is distinguished from a title search or a title examination, which is a search of all
pertinent records, not just of a specific name and a specific format.
24. First Fin. Bank, FSB, 477 So. 2d at 1270.
25. Voclkel v. Harrison, 572 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So. 2d 391
(1991).
26. A judicial mortgage is created simply by filing a money judgment with the recorder of
mortgages. La. Civ. Code arts. 3299-3300. A legal mortgage is created in accordance with
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mortgagor's name takes on more importance' than in a conventional mortgage,
where a property description not only is required but becomes the controlling
issue.27 Names that are not even close to the actual name of the owner may be
ineffective to create a legal or judicial mortgage or a privilege on property.
Therefore, recordation of a lien against "Greener & Sumner, Architects" was
insufficient to create a materialman's lien against the owner of a property known
as Corporate Towers, Ltd., although the name "Greener & Sumner Architects"
was a "d/b/a." This was the holding of Cardinal Federal Savings Bank v.
Corporate Towers Partners, Ltd.28 Likewise, in Ducote v. United States,2 9 a
tax lien was avoided because it was recorded in the name of "Hugh es J. de la
Vero ne II" rather than in the name of "Hugu es J. de la Verg ne II." On the
other hand, in Succession of Montgomery,30 recording a judgment against
"Sterling N. Harris" resulted in a judicial mortgage against property owned by
Mr. Harris, whether purchased in the name of "Sterling N. Harris" or merely
"Sterling Harris."
Obviously, when the mortgagor's name is the sole method of determining
what property may be affected by the mortgage, lien, or privilege, the name is
more important than when it is merely a method to get into the public records
to find a property description. Although there is no express authority for this
point, the following proposed principles are supportable by the jurisprudence and
represent a reasonable policy under the Louisiana Public Records Doctrine:
(1) In a conventional mortgage, the name of the mortgagor on the
document may be the mortgagor's actual name or any reasonable
variation of the name. 3 '
(2) The name in a document that creates a judicial or legal mortgage
or creates a lien or privilege without a property description is effective
as to third parties if the legal name of the mortgagor or any reasonable
variation is contained in the document; however, courts are entitled to
review such names with stricter scrutiny than if a conventional mortgage
were involved.
particularized laws. La. Civ. Code art. 3301. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 322 (creating a legal
mortgage in favor of a minor subject to a natural tutorship). Both judicial and legal mortgages are
general in nature and need not contain descriptions of specific properties burdened by the mortgage.
La. Civ. Code art. 3303.
27. See the discussion of La. Civ. Code art. 2440, infra text accompanying notes 33-41,
28. 629 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993). This opinion is merely one part of a lengthy
litigation process. For an earlier decision, see Cardinal Fed. Say. Bank v. Corporate Towers Partners,
Ltd., 564 So. 2d 1282 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
29. , (In re de ]a Vergne), 156 B.R. 773 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1993).
30. 46 So. 2d 677 (La. App. Orl. 1950). See also Metairie Bank & Trust Co. v. Wendryhoski,
338 So. 2d 978 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), writ dismissed, 345 So. 2d 498 (1977).
31. Under this rule, any of the following may be appropriate for a mortgage against "James
Patrick Johnson": "James P. Johnson," "James Johnson," "Jim Johnson," "]. Johnson," "J.P.
Johnson," "Jimmy Johnson," or "Jamie Johnson." More difficult questions would arise if the name
in the document was listed as "James Jahnson," or "Patrick Johnson."
1995]
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III. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION IN A MORTGAGE
All conventional mortgages must contain a property description; a conven-
tional mortgage must "state precisely the nature and situation of each of the
immovables or other property over which it is granted. 32
Official Revision comment (b) to Article 2440 states in, pertinent part:
(b) Under this Article, a description of immovable property in an act
of sale is sufficient if it enables a person to locate and identify the
property.
Hargrove v. Hodge, 33 cited in the comment, states:
The description in a deed must be such that the property intended
to be conveyed can be located and identified, and the general rule is
that the description must fully appear within the four comers of the
instrument itself, or that the deed should refer to some map, plat or
deed as a part of the description, so that the same may be clear.
The purpose of registry is that third persons may have notice of the
transfer, and, if the description in the deed is so vague, indefinite and
uncertain that the property cannot be located and identified, the sale is
void as to third persons. who deal upon the faith of the public records.
The deed, under which defendant claims, is too vague and indefinite-it
really describes nothing.34
It is interesting to note the requirements of Article 2440 are for the
effectiveness of a mortgage even as between the parties. Whether parol evidence
can be used to correct a totally invalid property description is an open question.
A recent case that did not question the effectiveness of a property description
was Belle Pass Terminal, Inc. v. John, Inc.,3 in which an act of sale and a
mortgage included, apparently, the sole property description as:
Any and all assets and improvements located on properties owned,
leased, or rented by John, Inc., Fourchon Docks, Inc. and Joe Blanchard
in Fourchon, Louisiana.
36
If third parties were involved, it is questionable whether this description, standing
alone, would be sufficient to affect them.
While most cautious attorneys today use metes and bounds descriptions for
rural property, including reference to acquisition transactions, and neighboring
32. La. Civ. Code art. 3288.
33. 9 La. App. 434, 121 So. 224 (2d Cir. 1928), writ refused, No. 3281 (Jan. 28, 1929).
34. Id. at 436, 121 So. at 225.
35. 634 So. 2d 466 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 638 So. 2d 1094 (1994).
36. Id. at 472.
[Vol. 55
SECURITY DEVICES
properties, and while most cautious attorneys in urban areas refer to subdivisions,
maps, and plats in developed areas, there are older cases where the descriptions
are, to be generous, cryptic. For example, sufficient descriptions were found to
exist for the following:
[Mortgagor's] entire landed interest in the... parish of West Feliciana,
situated on and adjacent to the Mississippi river [sic], and composed of
thirty-eight hundred acres of land more or less, as per acts of sale to be
found at [the recorder's] office in the town of St. Francisville, parish
aforesaid."
and
A certain cotton plantation upon which ... John Tullis resides.3"
The former description, concerning West Feliciana Parish, arguably is close to
the line, since the name of the vendor is given and therefore reference and
review of that earlier act is appropriate. The latter description, however, is.such
that it is difficult to believe any court today would sustain it. Indeed, in a
number of older cases equally cryptic descriptions were held invalid. For
example, the following descriptions were all held invalid: (1) "[AIIl the property
owned by us in the Parish of Orleans"; 9 (2) All property appertaining to the
succession of Joseph Schalatre; 4 and (3) "All the property herein described
consisting of one house and lot, with other improvements thereon; also the half
interest in the store building adjoining, with all fight and title and interest of the
[mortgagor]."''
IV. AN UPDATE ON DUE PROCESS
Because Louisiana is not a "self-help" state and does not have a "deed of
trust" theory by which a creditor obtains title to property as security for a
debt,42 a creditor who wishes to seize and sell immovable property must do so
through the court system. This involves either a lawsuit by ordinary process or
by executory process, both of which require seizure by the sheriff. Therefore,
state action is involved and the requirements of due process under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution must be considered.
37. City Nat'l Bank v. Barrow, 21 La. Ann. 396, 396 (1869).
38. Miller v. Utley-Holloway Sawmill Co., 168 La. 934, 938, 123 So. 625, 626 (1929).
39. State ex reL Brisbois v. Recorder of Mortgages, 13 Orl. App. 229 (La. App. 1915). writ
denied, No. 6559 (Feb. 23, 1916). This description was held invalid even as between the parties to
the mortgage.
40. Edwards v. Caulk, 5 La. Ann. 123 (1850).
41. Keiffer Bros. v. Starn, 27 La. Ann. 282 (1875).
42. See, e.g., Miller v. Shotwell, 38 La. Ann. 890 (1886).
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There are a number of key casesinvolving procedural due process issues
that have an impact on Louisiana foreclosures. 3 The current rule in Louisiana
is that because of due process requirements, owners, mortgageholders, and other
possessors of real rights must be given constitutionally required notices prior to
being deprived of pr6perty rights." The essential requirement under Menno-
nite45 is that the holder of a protected property interest must be given notice of
the sale'46 In an attempt to preserve the sanctity of titles of property, and to
preserve the due process rights of those who do not receive the necessary notice,
the legislature adopted Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3886.1 in 1991,"' which
43. The key procedural due process cases are: Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992);
Connecticut v. Doehr, 500 U.S. 1, II1 S. Ct. 2105 (1991); Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc.
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791,
103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983); Lugar v. Edmondston Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982); Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149. 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94
S. Ct. 1895 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820 (1969); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950); Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
937, 110 S. Ct. 331 (1989); Small Engine Shop, Inc. v. Cascio, 878 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1989);
Sterling v. Block, No. CA-89-4682, 1992 WL 365114 (E.D. La. Nov. 25, 1992); Bonner v. B-W
Util., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. La. 1978); Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 568 (La. 1987); Buckner
v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1972), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 901, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
44. See, e.g., Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 568 (La. 1987). See also Michael H. Rubin, Security
Devices, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La. L. Rev. 495 (1988); Michael H. Rubin & E.
Keith Carter, Notice of Seizure in Mortgage Foreclosures and Tax Sale Proceedings: The
Ramifications of Mennonite, 48 La. L. Rev. 535 (1988); Michael H. Rubin & R. Marshall Grodner,
Security Devices, Developments in the Law, 1991-1992, 53 La. L. Rev. 969 (1993).
45. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
46. See Rubin & Carter, supra note 44; Rubin & Grodner, supra note 44.
47. La. R.S. 13:3886.1 (Supp. 1994) provides:
A. The failure to notify any lienholder or other interested person having an interest in the
property shall not affect the rights of the seizing creditor nor invalidate the sheriff's sale;
nor shall any lien, privilege, or other encumbrance that is inferior to the rank of the lien
of the seizing creditor affect the property after the sheriff's adjudication. The exclusive
remedy for any person affected by the provisions of this Subsection shall be to institute
a claim by summary pleadings, within one year from the date of the sheriff's adjudication,
proving that he has been damaged by the failure to notify him. In connection with any
such claim, the court shall consider and the person claiming damages shall have the
burden of proving all of the following:
(1) That his name and address were reasonably ascertainable through the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
(2) That he lacked actual knowledge of the seizure.
(3) The respective ranking and amounts of all liens, privileges, and other encumbrances
affecting the property as of the date of the sheriff's adjudication.
(4) The value of such respective rights.
(5) The value of the property as of the date of the sheriff's adjudication.
(6) The respective positions the parties would have occupied had the required notice been
given.
(7) His ability and capacity to have obtained funds to purchase the property at the
foreclosure sale had the required notice been given.
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grants a claim for damages to the holder of the property right who was not
notified if the complaining party can prove that there was equity in the property
and that, had notice been given, equity could have been preserved.
Although no Louisiana court has yet definitively interpreted this provision,
several courts have indicated a willingness to allow creditors who fail to give
notice to use procedures similar to those of the statute or to conduct a new sale.
For example, in USX Corp. v. Champlin,"' a second mortgageholder was not
given notice of a foreclosure sale. The court determined that although the first
mortgageholder had purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, it would not
elevate the second mortgageholder to a first lien position. The court ordered the
property to be resold at a private auction and found this to be an "appropriately
tailored remedy. '49 The court further stated, "it does not completely restore the
parties to the status quo, but it does restore the opportunity to bid the property
and purchase at the foreclosure sale while avoiding the wastefulness of a second
foreclosure proceeding."50
It should be noted, however, when the person to whom notice is not given
is the federal government, a different result may apply because the federal
government, particularly the Internal Revenue Service, has a "federally prescribed
remedy"'" that may not be available to private-party litigants.52
The scope of procedural due process continues to receive scrutiny from the
highest levels. The United States Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to
review the issue in both United States v. Carlton" and United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property.54 While Carlton involved retroactive legislation
and Good involved seizure of property under a drug forfeiture statute, the
language of the cases may well turn out to be as important as that of Mennonite,
which involved a tax sale but which was later held to apply to private foreclosure
actions.
In Carlton, the Supreme Court held a retroactive change in the tax code did
not violate the due process rights of taxpayers although it was clear the party
(8) That in such circumstances he would have bid on the property in such an amount as
to have prevented him from suffering the alleged damages, either by such bid being
successful or by such bid leading to a higher bid by another party.
B. In no event shall the claim of any such person exceed the value of the interest he
possessed on the date of the sheriff's adjudication.
C. The provisions of this Section shall be applied both retrospectively and prospectively;
however, any action for which the time period for bringing such action would otherwise
be shortened by the provisions hereof shall be instituted within one year from July 17.
1991, and any suit not instituted within that time and any claims relating thereto shall be
forever barred.
48. 992 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 1386.
50. Id.
51. Id. (discussing Myers v. United States, 647 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981)).
52. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 647 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981).
53. 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
54. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
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litigant had relied upon the statute prior to its retroactive amendment." In a
separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, made the
following comment about due process:
[Tihe Due Process Clause guarantees no substantive rights, but only (as
it says) process.5 6
In James Daniel Good Real Property, the federal civil forfeiture laws
57
were at issue. Although the case involved neither a private foreclosure action
nor any mortgages, the language of the case may ultimately prove as broad as
that of Mennonite. The importance of Mennonite is that notice and an
opportunity to be heard is what is crucial prior to a deprivation of rights. This
rule was expanded and clarified in James Daniel Good Real Property.
The underlying facts are that Hawaii police officers executing a search
warrant in 1985 found 89 pounds of marijuana and other drugs. Four and a half
years later, the United States filed an action seeking to forfeit Good's house and
the four acre parcel on which it was located. In an ex parte proceeding the
warrant of arrest in rem was issued. Using the in rem proceeding and the
magistrate's order, the government seized the property without prior notice to
Good or an adversary proceeding. 58 "At the time of the seizure, Good was
renting his home to tenants for $900 per month. The Government permitted the
55. "Although Carlton's reliance is uncontested-and the reading of the original statute on
which he relied appears to have been correct-his reliance alone is insufficient to establish a
constitutional violation." Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2023.
56. id. at 2027 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. The federal civil forfeiture laws are contained in 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
This statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate
the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent
of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Although the Justice Department has used the 1984 forfeiture laws extensively and, some allege,
aggressively, the Court has put some limitations on this approach. The Coun, for example, has used
the Eighth Amendment to add a "proportionality" test to civil forfeiture actions. Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). The Court has ruled that appeal bonds may not be necessary to
challenge forfeitures under wrongful circumstances. Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 554 (1992). The Court also has upheld an "innocent owner" defense to civil forfeiture for those
who did not know their property was used in drug transactions. United States v. A Parcel of Land,
Bldgs., Appurtenances & Improvements, Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 113 S. Ct.
1126 (1993). For comments on these opinions, see Richard C. Reuben, Putting Brakes on Forfeiture,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 14.
58. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 497-98.
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tenants to remain on the premises subject to an occupancy agreement, but
directed the payment of future rents to the United States Marshal." 9
Good challenged the seizure and the Court found it to be unlawful. The
Court stated the underlying question and its holding succinctly:
The principal question presented is whether, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the Government in a civil forfeiture case from seizing real
property without first affording the owner notice and an opportunity to
be heard. We hold that it does.6°
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, underlined the importance of both
prior notice and a hearing, employing forceful language and relying upon a prior
case involving private-party litigants. The following quotation from the opinion
may be held to apply to private-party foreclosures:
The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution's
command of due process. "The purpose of this requirement is not only
to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more
particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from
arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken
deprivations of property....
The Court noted the importance of notice of a hearing is unrelated to actual
interference with an owner's possession or use:
And in Connecticut v. Doehr, we held that a state statute authorizing
prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing
was unconstitutional, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
even though the attachment did not interfere with the owner's use or
possession and did not affect, as a general matter, rentals from existing
leaseholds.62
Ex parte and prejudgment seizures create an "unacceptable risk of error"
according to the Court. 63  Although the language the Court used involves
government seizures only, its implications are broad:
The ex parte preseizure proceeding affords little or no protection to the
innocent owner. In issuing a warrant of seizure, the magistrate judge
need determine only that there is probable cause to believe that the real
59. Id. at 498.
60. Id. at 497.
61. Id. at 500-01 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994-95
(1972)).
62. Id. at 501 (citation omitted).
63. Id.
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property was "used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of" a felony narcotics offense.
The Government is not required to offer any evidence on the question
of innocent ownership or other potential defenses a claimant might
have .. .. "[Flairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided
determination of facts decisive of rights.... No better instrument has
been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of
serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it."
The purpose of an adversary hearing is to ensure the requisite
neutrality that must inform all governmental decisionmaking. That
protection is of particular importance here, where the Government has
a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding. 6,
Consider how, with just a few minor changes, this argument might be
adapted to certain types of seizures involving private parties. In ex parte pre-
seizure proceedings involving private parties, the foreclosing creditor is not,
using language from the case, "required to offer any evidence on ... potential
defenses' 65 the owner or mortgagor might have.
The Court went on to note it is not merely the lack of notice that is crucial;
physical seizure itself is inherently suspect absent procedural protections for the
possessor of the property interest.
Nor is the ex parte seizure of real property necessary to accomplish the
statutory purpose of § 881(a)(7). The Government's legitimate interests
at the inception of forfeiture proceedings are to ensure that the property
not be sold, destroyed, or used for further illegal activity prior to the
forfeiture judgment. These legitimate interests can be secured without
seizing the subject property.
Sale of the property can be prevented by filing a notice of lis
pendens as authorized by state law when the forfeiture proceedings
commence.... The Government's policy of leaving occupants in
possession of real property under an occupancy agreement pending the
final forfeiture ruling demonstrates that there is no serious concern
about destruction in the ordinary case. 66
Not all pre-judgment seizures are suspect. The Court specifically noted
procedural protections can apply. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's partial
concurrence 67 (in which Justices Scalia and O'Connor joined) specifically relied
64. Id. at 502 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and Joint Anti-Facist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72, 71 S. Ct. 624, 647-49 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)) (citations omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 503.
67. Id. at 507-11 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part).
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upon Mitchell v. WT. Grant Co.," a case sustaining the validity of Louisiana's
sequestration provisions.
The importance of James Daniel Good Real Property cannot be understated.
If "the right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution's
command of due process," then what is crucial is the notice of the action that
will deprive the owner of property. Likewise, if physical seizure is suspect, and
if a notice of lis pendens may be sufficient, as James Daniel Good Real Property
indicated, then this leaves one to question whether Louisiana's procedures
involving erasure of lis pendens notices may cause concern for seizing creditors,
particularly remembering that private-party defendants who invoke state statutes
later found to be unconstitutional can be sued for liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.69 Under the rationale of James Daniel Good Real Property, the proper
method for a creditor who is concerned about the prejudgment seizure is to first
file a notice of lis pendens. On the other hand, under Louisiana law, when a
trial court orders removal of a lis pendens notice, this order is deemed an
interlocutory order, not an appealable order. A creditor who wishes to protect
its rights may thus have limited opportunity to do so if another creditor is
moving forward with a foreclosure sale.
For example, assume Creditor A is proceeding forward with a foreclosure
sale. Creditor B then files a suit for recognition of its mortgage and files a
notice of lis pendens. Creditor C files a writ of sequestration and Creditor D
files writs of attachment. Creditors B, C, and D all file notices of lis pendens
and the trial court orders these deleted from the public records. What are the
creditors to do? Some guidance is given in Dawsey v. Gruber.'0 The opinion,
in its entirety, reads:
[Writ] granted. Although cancellation of a notice of lis pendens is an
interlocutory judgment, relator has made a sufficient showing under the
facts of this case that the sale of the immovable property would cause
her irreparable harm. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal
dismissing relator's appeal is vacated and set aside. Relator's suspen-
sive appeal is reinstated. Case remanded to the court of appeal for
further proceedings."
The cautious creditor whose notice of lis pendens has been removed may
want to cite Dawsey v. Gruber as authority to appellate courts that writs should
be granted as a matter of course when an erasure of a notice of lis pendens has
occurred.
It can be anticipated that the issue of due process will continue to occupy
the Supreme Court's attention. Justice Thomas, in his partial concurrance in
68. 416 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
69. See, e.g.. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
70. 629 So. 2d 402 (La. 1993).
71. Id. at 402 (citation omitted).
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James Daniel Good Real Property, spoke about a trend that he sees in the
Court's approach:
Like the majority, I believe that "[i]ndividual freedom finds tangible
expression in property rights." In my view, as the Court has increasing-
ly emphasized the creation and delineation of entitlements in recent
years, it has not always placed sufficient stress upon the protection of
individuals' traditional rights in real property. Although I disagree with
the outcome reached by the Court, I am sympathetic to its focus on the
protection of property rights-rights that are central to our heritage.72
V. DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
Louisiana law has always reflected the tension between allowing a creditor
to collect the debt when owed, including foreclosure and sale of collateral, and
protecting the debtor's right to a fair valuation of the collateral. If every
sheriff's sale always brought a fair price, then there would be no need to worry
about either the appraisal process or the bid amount. On the other hand, because
of the foreclosures during the Great Depression, the legislature became concerned
about whether sheriff's sales and the bidding process actually elicited both
competitive bids and a price that was fair and reasonable to the debtor. Thus,
the Deficiency Judgment Act was enacted." As originally written, the function
of the Deficiency Judgment Act was narrow: if a creditor proceeded to judicial
foreclosure without appraisal, the creditor was prohibited from obtaining a
deficiency. Whatever the collateral brought, the creditor could not obtain more
from the debtor after the sale. The scope of the act was quickly expanded from
solely judicial sales to any kind of sale, private or public, judicial or nonjudi-
cial.74
When the Code of Civil Procedure was created in 1960, its rules were
meshed with those of the Deficiency Judgment Act. Since appraisals are
required in all ordinary proceedings," and since deficiency judgments are
prohibited following sales without appraisals,76 both the appraisal process and
the appraisal amount become critical. However, prior to 1988, there were not
a large number of cases dealing with the appraisal process because the Louisiana
Supreme Court had held in League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery 7 that
"fundamental" defects in executory proceedings (meaning defects in the
pleadings) could bar a deficiency. Thus, League Central Credit Union produced
72. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. C1. 492, 515 (1993) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part) (citation omitted).
73. 1934 La. Acts No. 28, § I (codified as amended at La. R.S. 13:4106 (1991)).
74. See, e.g., Home Fin. Serv. v. Walmsley, 176 So. 415 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
75. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2332.
76. La. R.S. 13:4106 (1991).
77. 251 La. 971, 207 So. 2d 762 (1968).
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a slew of cases trying to determine whether an alleged defect in the proceedings
was so "fundamental" as to bar a later deficiency judgment. League Central
Credit Union also led to a situation in which debtors did not contest anything in
executory proceedings, preferring to wait until the deficiency judgment action
was brought. If the debtor contested the executory proceeding as defective prior
to the judicial sale, the creditor either would correct the proceeding or convert
it to an ordinary suit, thereby "curing" the defects. On the other hand, if the
debtor waited until the deficiency judgment action was brought, the debtor
always had a chance of preventing any further deficiency action, because at that
point it would be too late to "correct" the defect in the executory proceeding, for
the seizure and sale already would have occurred.78
Baton Rouge Petroleum Center79 put an end to what some had termed the
"ambush" tactics of debtor's counsel-waiting for the deficiency action to raise
the potential defect. Baton Rouge Petroleum Center used a "raise it or waive it"
approach; unless the debtor raised the defect in the executory proceedings, the
debtor could not raise it later as a bar to the deficiency judgment action. 0
Thus, League Central Credit Union was overruled. Baton Rouge Petroleum
Center, however, specifically emphasized that the integrity of the appraisal
process remained crucial:
Although [the public policy behind the Deficiency Judgment Act] is
broad and strong, there is nothing in its history or expression that
indicates an intention to bar a creditor whofully complies with appraisal
requirements from obtaining a deficiency judgment simply because of
a lack of authentic evidence in the executory proceeding.8'
Therefore, Baton Rouge Petroleum Center refocused the attention of courts
away from "defects" in executory proceedings and onto the appraisal process
itself.82  This is not to say that courts have not been concerned with other
defects in executory proceedings; the focus, however, has been on the appraisal
process itself.83
78. It is interesting to speculate whether League Central Credit Union and its rationale played
any role in the Louisiana Supreme Court's upholding of the validity of the executory process in
Buckner v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326 (1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 901, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
Although League Central Credit Union is not cited in Buckner, some have argued that because
defects in the executory proceedings would prevent a deficiency judgment, this may have made it
easier for the court to sustain the validity of Louisiana's executory process against constitutional
challenges. There is no direct evidence, however, to support this line of thought.
79. First Guar. Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Ctr., Inc., 529 So. 2d 834 (La. 1988).
80. Id. at 841-44.
81. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
82. For a discussion of Baton Rouge Petroleum Center and the past jurisprudence under League
Central Credit Union, see Rubin, supra note 44.
83. See, e.g., Samco Mortgage Corp. v. Armstrong, 582 So. 2d 848 (La. 1991), rev'g 579 So.
2d 521 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (concerning a "notice of private sale" issued by a creditor); Citicorp
Acceptance Co. v. Roussell, 601 So. 2d 350 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 177 (1992)
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While lower courts during the last few years have struggled with issues
involving the appraisal process, the matter appears destined for future clarifica-
tion by the Louisiana Supreme Court, although several recent cases show the
court's approach. The recent battle lines have involved how the Deficiency
Judgment Act and the appraisal process interact with in globo sales.
The Civil Code allows a creditor to conduct an in globo sale. Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 2295 provides:
If several items of property have been seized, or if one item of
property which is divisible into portions has been seized, the judgment
debtor, at any time prior to the first advertisement, may designate the
order in which the items or portions of property will be sold, except that
the judgment creditor can direct the sale of property on which he has
a mortgage, or a privilege other than that resulting from the seizure.
If the judgment debtor does not designate the order of sale, the
order of sale shall be at the discretion of the sheriff.
When property is offered by items or portions and the total price
bid is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, with interest and costs, or if
the judgment debtor so requests, the property shall be offered in globo
and thus sold if a higher bid is obtained.
The language of Article 2295 appears to be clear. If the judgment creditor
has a mortgage or a privilege other than that resulting from a seizure, i.e., a
conventional mortgage, then the judgment creditor ought to be able to direct the
order of sale. No court has expressly reached this decision, although the
supreme court has held creditors who foreclose by executory process are entitled
to direct the order of sale. 4 Obviously, the creditor who employs executory
proceedings must have a conventional mortgage or security interest containing
a confession of judgment clause."
Given that Article 2295 both allows the creditor to direct the order of sale
and allows property to be offered in globo, two questions have arisen concerning
in globo sale procedures: first, when can a debtor direct the in globo sale or
claim prejudice from an in globo sale; and second, is the right to conduct an in
globo sale equivalent to the right to conduct an in globo appraisal?
(using language about fundamental defects in the appraisal process and dealing with notice to appoint
appraisers); Cenval Leasing Corp. v. Nunnery, 577 So. 2d 1042 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (holding
the Deficiency Judgment Act does not apply to items governed by the Lease of Movables Act, La.
R.S. 9:3301-:3342 (1991)); Citicorp Acceptance Co. v. Gelpi, 563 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 567 So. 2d 111 (1990) (applying Baton Rouge Petroleum Center retroactively).
84. First Fin. Bank, FSB v. Hunter Forest Ltd. Partnership, 456 So. 2d 1380 (La. 1984).
85. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 2631 and 2635 require that, in order for
executory process to be available, there must be a document creating the mortgage or privilege that
contains a confession of judgment. Thus, this can only be done through a conventional mortgage or
a vendor's privilege; it cannot arise through a legal or judicial mortgage.
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In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Moss,6 in globo sales were held
to be prohibited on separately mortgaged properties when there is no cross-
collateralization clause in the documentation. In this case, the Mosses and others
placed two separate mortgages on two separate lots; the Mosses ended up with
ownership of both of the lots. The mortgages were executed in 1982. In 1988
the creditor filed a single petition for executory process, foreclosing on both
mortgages and requesting the properties be sold at judicial sale with appraisal.
The petition did not request the properties be sold either separately or together.
None of the notices the Mosses received indicated the properties would be sold
together; they merely indicated the properties would be sold "in accordance with
law." Although the Mosses were provided with a notice of sale and a notice to
appoint an appraiser, they failed to appoint an appraiser and one was appointed
by the sheriff. The properties were sold for 70% of the appraised value. The
sale of the two lots, each of which contained four-plex units, was in globo.87
The supreme court found that the in globo sales were "unauthorized."88
The Moss court specifically noted that if the debtor had "cross-collateralized" the
various properties, then an in globo sale would have been acceptable.8 9 The
lack of cross-collateralization allowed the court to distinguish the case before it
(where there were two separate mortgages) from both Baton Rouge Petroleum
Center and First Bank & Trust Co. v. Chenault.90
It is interesting to note Moss did not use as its rationale a discussion of
whether the debtor was actually prejudiced; rather, it was the "substantive defect
in the executory proceeding"'" that prevented the deficiency. This phrase,
"substantive defect," seems to have echoes of the old "fundamental defect"
language of League Central Credit Union, which Baton Rouge Petroleum Center
overruled.' Therefore, on the one hand, it might be argued the procedural niceties
of the foreclosure process are more important than whether the debtor can show
prejudice. If so, this type of argument is supported by Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in United States v. Carlton that "the Due Process Clause
guarantees no substantive rights, but only (as it says) process." 92 On the other
hand, if the function of the Deficiency Judgment Act is to protect the creditor
from obtaining windfall at the foreclosure sale to the debtor's detriment,93 then
perhaps the underlying substance of the foreclosure sale (i.e., the true value of
86. 616 So. 2d 648 (La. 1993).
87. Id. at 649-50. Apparently the "70% bid" was because of the Durrett rule, a rule established
in Durret v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). and having a basis in the
"common law" of attorneys, but not necessarily in federal jurisprudence. For a further discussion of
Durret and the fact it has now been overruled, see infra notes 130-144 and accompanying text.
88. Moss, 616 So. 2d at 654.
89. Id. at 653-56.
90. 576 So. 2d 1123 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
91. Moss, 616 So. 2d at 656.
92. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2027 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. For a discussion of the possibility of a windfall during the deficiency judgment process, see
Rubin, supra note 44, at 501-03.
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the property (not merely its appraised value) and whether the bid price
approached the true value) should be the focus.
It is possible, however, this latter point, although not directly addressed,
underlies the recent decision in Williams v. Perkins-Siegen Partnership.94 In
Williams, three separate tracts were mortgaged in a single act. The tracts had
been acquired for different prices and had different tax values and different
characteristics; however, the tracts adjoined one another. The creditor's appraiser
did not appraise each tract "with such minuteness that it can be sold together or
separately" under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4365(C), but rather reached an
in globo value for all three tracts and then gave one third of this aggregate
amount to each tract. The debtors did not appoint an appraiser for themselves,
and therefore the sheriff appointed one for them pursuant to Louisiana law. The
sheriff-appointed appraiser used the creditor's appraiser's approach and reached
identical numbers. A later suit was filed for a deficiency judgment, and it was
in this second action that the appraisal process was challenged.9
The supreme court, after having ruled originally for the debtor,96 withdrew
its opinion, granted a rehearing, and then ruled unanimously for the creditor.97
The narrow result of the case is that there is no prohibition against an in globo
appraisal on cross-collateralized tracts if the appraisal form gives a value for
each tract. The practical result appears to be a debtor must appoint an appraiser
or challenge the appraisal prior to sale in order to maintain a later claim in the
deficiency judgment action.
Because Baton Rouge Petroleum Center focused attention on the appraisal
process, not only is the appraisal important, but also the procedure by which the
appraisal occurs and the debtor's right to know about it become crucial. It
should be remembered the notice of a sale itself is a federal constitutional due
process rule under Mennonite and its progeny. Louisiana procedural rules,
however, also play an important role.
What kind of notice is sufficient? Citizens Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Kinchen98 addresses the issue from the viewpoint of the Deficiency Judgment
Act. Hart purchased two commercial properties secured by a mortgage on the
property; Citizens Savings & Loan Association (Citizens) was the holder of the
note and mortgage. Hart sold the properties to Ritter who assumed the
obligations and bound himself in solido with Hart to Citizens. Ritter sold the
properties to Kinchen who "likewise assumed all the obligations imposed on
Hart."99 Citizens filed an executory process suit but only Kinchen was made a
defendant and received the demand for payment, notice to appoint an appraiser,
and notice of seizure. "Hart was not made a defendant, and no formal notices
94. 649 So. 2d 367 (La. 1995).
95. Id. at 368-69.
96. Williams v. Perkins-Siegen Partnership, 633 So. 2d 1247 (La. 1994).
97. Williams, 649 So. 2d at 371.
98. 622 So. 2d 662 (La. 1993).
99. Id. at 663.
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were served upon him[,J"' although Hart had actual notice. Following the
sale a deficiency was sought in which Hart was named as a defendant.
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that, to obtain a deficiency judgment,
the creditor must assure that the debtor receives the notice prescribed by statute,
notwithstanding the debtor's actual notice of the right to appoint an appraiser.
The court went out of its way to limit an earlier holding concerning what type
of notices a debtor must receive; however, it is important to note the court's
language is perhaps more expansive than it intended:
On the other hand, there is no statutory provision requiring the
creditor to prove service of any other notice or process on a debtor prior
to the judicial sale as a condition precedent to a deficiency judgment.
Accordingly, we reject as incorrect the statement by the court of appeal
in the present case that a mortgagee, in order to recover a deficiency
judgment against an original mortgagor, is required to make him a party
to the executory proceeding or to have him served with notice of
demand or notice of seizure. For the same reason we are required to
remove from this court's opinion in Security Homestead Ass'n v.
Fuselier the implication that [Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article]
2721 or due process requires service of notice of seizure upon the
debtor as a condition precedent to a deficiency judgment. The
foregoing statements were neither required by the Deficiency Judgment
Act nor necessary to the analytical foundations of the holdings in those
cases.
10
'
It is interesting to note that, while attempting to limit Fuselier, the Court
uses the language "due process requires service of notice of seizure." It may be
difficult to reconcile the language of Kinchen, requiring notice of a right to
appoint an appraiser, with the language of Mennonite. Mennonite's language
about constitutionally required notice is:
Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice [of the
sale] is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which
will adversely affect the liberty or property interest of any party,
whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name
and address are reasonably ascertainable.'0°
Thus, it is the notice of sale, not the notice to appoint an appraiser, which
is required for constitutional due process.'0 3 Therefore, whether an appraisal
100. Id.
101. Id. at 664-65 (citation omitted).
102. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2712 (1983).
103. Therefore, the language of the Kinchen court equating due process requirements with the
Deficiency Judgment Act may be subject to future clarification, for Kinchen stated:
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is sought and whether an appraisal is timely does not necessarily relate to due
process requirements. Indeed, it could be argued due process has nothing to do
with the appraisal process itself, but only the sale. It may well be that a judicial
sale could be held in accordance with due process procedures (because the debtor
had actual notice of the sale) even though a deficiency would not be allowed
because the procedural appraisal requirements of Louisiana law had not been
met. Likewise, one could envision a situation in which notice to appoint an
appraiser was given, but the sale date was moved and the debtor did not receive
a notice of the new sale date. In such an instance, the required appraisal notice
might have been given under the Deficiency Judgment Act and Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure, but nonetheless an allegation is raised that due process might
have been violated. It can be anticipated there will be further litigation clarifying
this issue and making a distinction between those rights necessary for the
exercise of a deficiency judgment under Louisiana law and those required for due
process guarantees.
A second holding of Kinchen is worthy of special notice. As originally
enacted, the Deficiency Judgment Act was so narrowly drawn it discouraged
creditors and debtors from voluntary work-out arrangements by which the debtor
would give property to the creditor and agree to be bound for a deficiency, even if
the purpose of this was merely to avoid the costs and expense of a sheriff's sale.
Therefore, parties who might otherwise have worked out their differences were
prohibited from doing so and forced to resort to litigation because, otherwise, the
debtor could not obtain the deficiency judgment. As a result of this narrow
approach, which forced parties to court, the legislature enacted two special
provisions on commercial and consumer transactions allowing the parties to agree
to a deficiency if certain safeguards were in place. Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:4108.1 (involving commercial transactions) and 13:4108.2 (involving consumer
transactions) contain the same requirement. The debtor cannot be liable for a
deficiency beyond the reasonably equivalent value (as defined in the statute) of the
property.'c 4 A finding of "reasonably equivalent value" requires a prior agree-
ment between debtors and creditors. This is the express holding of Kinchen. In
order to take advantage of'the statute and pursue the debtor for a deficiency
following a private sal'e or an invalid appraisal, the creditor must have had an
agreement with the debtor as to value. This agreement probably can take place only
after default, for Louisiana has long eschewed procedures that are thinly-disguised
methods for creditors, at the inception of a loan, to become owners of the
collateral.105 Absent consent by both creditor and debtor on the reasonably
Consequently, the statutory requirement that the debtor be served with written notice of
his right to appoint an appraiser to value the property prior to its sale affords him fairness
and due process by assuring him notice and an adequate opportunity to see that the
protections of the Deficiency Judgment Act are fully asserted in his behalf.
Citizens Say: & Loan Ass'n v. Kinchen, 622 So. 2d 662, 665 (La. 1993).
104. See La. R.S. 13:4108.1-:4108.2 (1991).
105. Since the edict of Constantine annulling and prohibiting what was known as the lex
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equivalent value prior to the sale, the statute cannot be used, for "in the absence of
such an agreement the statute is inoperative."'O'
Given the importance of the notice for a deficiency judgment under Kinchen,
and given that, under Wyatt v. Cole,'0 7 a foreclosing creditor (perhaps a creditor's
attorney) can be liable for a wrongful seizure, the method of giving notice is
important. In Central Progressive Bank v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's
Office, 08 a plaintiff who had been prevented from obtaining a deficiency because
of an invalid service by the sheriff filed suit against the sheriff. The court held the
sheriff was not liable, reasoning "it is incumbent on the creditor to exercise
reasonable diligence to assure strict compliance with every legal formality to
guarantee for itself a deficiency judgment."' 9 Apparently the court would find
a creditor liable for failing to recognize and check on improper service. Such a
holding is curious because it relieves the sheriff of his strong statutory duty to make
proper service. Further, the court apparently would make the creditor some type
of insurer of the sheriff, because the court indicated, in obiter dicta, that even if the
return was false (even if the sheriff did not make the return at all), the creditor
would be liable." ° It can be argued this type of rationale misconstrues the
relationship between the creditor and the sheriff. All the creditor can do is put into
motion the state statutes. The creditor cannot direct the sheriff in the sheriffs
duties and, it can be argued, should not be imputed with knowledge of deficiencies
in the sheriff's procedures or incorrect actions by the sheriff. On the other hand,
when the creditor does discover a mistake has been made, a remedy is available.
In Louisiana Gear Manufacturing, Inc. v. Burney,"' a creditor filed an action to
annul a sheriffs sale and reinstate its encumbrances when it discovered a sheriff's
return indicated both movables and immovables had been seized. In fact, only
movables had been seized, but this was not discovered until after the sale. The
court allowed the creditor to nullify the judgment and the sale it had obtained and
to start over.
commissoria and the stipulation in the contract of pledge which it authorized, whereby, in
default of payment by the pledgor, the thing pledged became the property of the pledgee without
further action on his part, such stipulations have been prohibited in all countries where the civil
law prevails, and the prohibition has long since become part of the common law, the
commentators on both systems agreeing that they are contra bonos mores and oppressive; that
they involve the abuse of the power of the strong over the weak, represent odious speculations
by those who have money, at the expense of those who need it, and are unconscionable.
Alcolca v. Smith, 150 La. 482, 488, 90 So. 769, 771 (1921) (citations omitted).
106. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kinchen, 622 So. 2d 662, 665 (La. 1993).
107. 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
108. 618 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 851 (1993).
109. Id. at 989.
110. The court stated, "[lIikewise, if the return was false, i.e., service was never made but was
returned, falsely indicating personal service of the Appraiser Notice, defendant is still entitled to
summary judgment in its favor." Id. at 990.
111. No. 92-CV-1386 (W.D. La. Feb. !1, 1994).
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VI. COLLATERAL MORTGAGES-IN PERSONAM OR IN REM?
Bankers Trust v. Smith'. 2 dealt with a number of issues. One result of the
case was an in rem seizure and sale of property was allowed and the court
determined a judgment could only be awarded in rem because of the procedural
posture and facts of the case. Not specifically addressed by the case, but raised by
implication, is whether collateral mortgages are in rem or in personam.
Whether a collateral mortgage note imparts personal liability to the maker of
the note is not an academic question when the maker of the collateral mortgage note
and the maker of the handnote are two different individuals." 3 While it may be
true that collateral mortgages eventually will sink into oblivion because of the ease
with which Louisiana Civil Code article 3298 now allows a "noteless" or "multiple
indebtedness" mortgage to secure all loans without the necessity of the complica-
tions of a collateral mortgage," 4 it is clear, at least for the next ten years or so,
that collateral mortgages may be used by practitioners and will continue to be the
subject of judicial decisions.
Every Louisiana court that has squarely addressed the issue (although the
Louisiana Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to do so) has held a collateral
mortgage is an in personam obligation, although at least one federal court has
reached a contrary conclusion."' Consider the following example: Nephew goes
112. 629 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 393 (1994).
113. There is no requirement that there be a "handnote" at all. See New Orleans Silversmith,
Inc. v. Toups, 261 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 263 So. 2d 47 (1972). For a
discussion of collateral mortgages, see Malcolm A. Meyer, Meyer's Manual on Louisiana Real Estate
(1992); Peter S. Title. Louisiana Real Estate Transactions (1991); William E. Crawford, Executory
Process and Collateral Mortgages-Authentic Evidence of the Hand Note, 33 La. L. Rev. 535 (1973);
Max Nathan, Jr. & Anthony P. Dunbar, The Collateral Mortgage: Logic and Experience, 49 La. L.
Rev. 39 (1988); Max Nathan, Jr. & H. Gayle Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage: A Reassessment
and Postscript, 36 La. L. Rev. 973 (1976); Max Nathan, Jr. & H. Gayle Marshall, The Collateral
Mortgage, 33 La. L. Rev. 497 (1973); Michael H. Rubin et al., Is the Collateral Mortgage Obsolete?,
41 La. B.J. 529 (1994); Rubin & Grodner, supra note 44; Bernard Keith Vetter, The Validity and
Ranking of Future Advance Mortgages in Louisiana, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 141 (1975); David S.
Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights of Louisiana Collateral Mortgages: Legislative Revisions,
New Rules, and a Modern Alternative, 55 La. L. Rev. 1 (1994). See also La. R.S. 9:5386-:5394
(1991 & Supp. 1994). The authors do not agree with Professor Crawford's conclusions that the
handnote is the "evidence" of the debt secured by the mortgage; it is the collateral mortgage note that
represents the debt the collateral mortgage secures.
114. For a discussion of this issue, see Rubin et al., supra note 113, at 531.
115. See, e.g., Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1979) (holding a collateral
mortgage note can prescribe); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Seven Gables, Inc., 501 So. 2d 280
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (holding a collateral mortgage can be assumed-an assumption is personal
liability), writ denied, 502 So. 2d 103 (1987); Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. O'Brien, 439 So. 2d 552 (La.
App. ist Cir.) (holding the use of phrases like "sole and absolute security," "sole security," and "in
rem" throughout both the note and pledge agreement at least create ambiguity as to parties' intent
about personal liability), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 590 (1983); Central Bank v. Bishop, 375 So. 2d 149
(La. App. 2d Cir.) (holding a collateral mortgage note bears interest from its date), writ denied, 378
So. 2d 435 (1979); Central Progressive Bank v. Doemer, 365 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978)
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to Lender to obtain a $100,000 loan. Lender wants security. The only security
Nephew has to offer is help from his rich Uncle X. Uncle X refuses to sign'
Lender's continuing guaranty document but is agreeable to giving a separate
negotiable note for $100,000. Uncle X will not co-sign or become an accommoda-
tion endorser on Nephew's note. The separate note given by Uncle X to Lender is
valid and enforceable," 6 although-it does not represent money the lender has
advanced or will advance. It is given for value."' It has been given for consider-
ation." 8 If Nephew defaults, Lender has two options. First, it could sue Nephew
on Nephew's note. Second, it could sue Uncle X on Uncle X's note. Clearly Uncle
X has personal liability under his note.
Now assume Lender asks Uncle X not merely for his own note but for
additional security. Uncle X now gives the same $100,000 note, but this time it is
paraphed for identification with an act of mortgage on Uncle X's property and the
mortgage is properly recorded." 9 The only difference now is Uncle X's note has
been paraphed for identification with an act of mortgage. No other change has been
made. It is submitted that Uncle X's note is not somehow transformed magically
(holding a collateral mortgage package secured the creditor to the lesser of (a) principal plus interest
on the principal obligation or (b) principal plus interest on the pledged note; the parties can by
agreement and with specific language create an in rem note, but this requires specific language). For
Louisiana's lower court cases holding the collateral mortgage note does create a personal obligation,
see Concordia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lowry, 533 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 539 So. 2d 46 (1989); Bank of Lafayette v. Bailey, 531 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), modified, 533 So. 2d 5 (1988) (limiting mortgagor's personal liability to the mortgaged property
and community property). For a federal court case holding a collateral mortgage note is by nature
in rem, see Pontchartrain State Bank v. Lybrand, 799 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. La. 1992). See also
Michael H. Rubin, Security Devices, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts For the 1978-1979
Term, 40 La. L. Rev. 572, 582 (1980). 1 have committed myself previously in writing to why a
collateral mortgage should be seen as an in personam obligation and I remain committed to this view.
116. Lender would hold the note pursuant to a security interest under Article 9 of the U.C.C.,
as adopted in Louisiana. See La. R.S. 10:9-101 to :9-605 (1993 & Supp. 1994). The note is an
"instrument" under the U.C.C., La. R.S. 10:9-105(1)(i) (1993), and a security interest is perfected by
delivery to the creditor. La. R.S. 10:9-304(1) (1993).
117. As defined in the U.C.C., "value" clearly encompasses a note given as security for the debt
of another.
Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable instruments and bank collections,
a person gives "value" for.rights if he acquires them
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for the extension of
immediately available credit whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a chargeback
is provided for in the event of difficulties in collection;
(b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a preexisting claim;
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a preexisting contract for purchase; or
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
La. R.S. 10:1-201(44) (1993) (emphasis added).
118. "'Consideration' means any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.... If
an instrument is issued for value ... the instrument is also issued for consideration." La. R.S. 10:3-
303(b) (1993). Thus, a note given as security for another is given for consideration.
119. For the rules relating to collateral mortgages after 1990 and perfection as to third parties,
see La. R.S. 9:5550-:5557 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
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from an in personam obligation to an in rem obligation merely because of the
paraph. Uncle X's note is negotiable and remains negotiable. Lender still has
several options if Nephew defaults. First, Lender can sue Nephew on Nephew's
note. As a second alternative, Lender can sue Uncle X on Uncle X's note. Third,
as an additional option, Lender can sue Uncle X to seize and sell the mortgaged
property and obtain a privilege on the proceeds of the sale. The proceeds of the
sale would then be applied to Uncle X's note. If the proceeds of the sale are
insufficient to pay off Uncle X's note (assume, for example, the proceeds of the
sale bring only $80,000), then Uncle X's note is extinguished only to the extent of
the value obtained at the sheriffs sale ($80,000). Therefore, $20,000 remains
extant on Uncle X's note and Uncle X can be sued for the difference, just as Uncle
X could be sued for the $100,000 before the paraph was put on the note, or in lieu
of pursuing the mortgaged property. It is submitted that cases finding collateral
mortgages are in rem by nature misconstrue the collateral mortgage device.
Perhaps it is the name "collateral mortgage" that causes the problem. If it were
referred to as a "security-interest-in-a-note-secured-by-a-mortgage," maybe the
analysis would be easier to see. Nonetheless, its form demonstrates that a collateral
mortgage package is primarily one of a security interest in a note, with additional
rights against mortgaged property.
This is not to say a collateral mortgage cannot be made into an in rem
obligation. Clearly the parties can disclaim liability in the collateral mortgage note
itself by using language of "non-recourse" or other "in rem" terminology. 2 '
Furthermore, the Civil Code expressly provides that parties, by contract, may grant
a mortgage even though there is no personal liability for the underlying obliga-
tion.' Finally, there are a number of ways to grant a mortgage securing the
obligation of another without executing a separate collateral mortgage note. For
example, Uncle X might give a mortgage in which the principal obligation would
be described not as Uncle X's note, but as Nephew's note. Similarly, a spouse
might give a mortgage on the spouse's community property interest securing only
the property and disclaiming any petrsonal liability for the granting of the mortgage.
The solution for those who wish to have in rem collateral mortgages is
simple--contract for it expressly. Merely granting a collateral mortgage, without
more, however, should not be seen as an express agreement to be bound only in
rem.
VII. COLLATERAL MORTGAGES AND INTERRUPTION OF PREscRIPTION
A collateral mortgage package (the collateral mortgage note secured by the
collateral mortgage) is, at its most basic, the granting of a security interest in a
120. For a case containing a note in which the parties disclaimed personal liability and which
was enforced as an in rem obligation, see Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. O'Brien, 439 So. 2d 552 (La. App.
ist Cir.), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 590 (1983).
121. La. Civ. Code art. 3297.
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note to secure another, underlying obligation. Prior to the advent of Chapter 9
of the Louisiana Commercial Laws, 22 the security interest in the collateral
mortgage note was obtained through a pledge. The underlying obligation does
not prescribe while the pledge is in existence.'2 On the other hand, while the
underlying obligation (sometimes referred to euphemistically as the "handnote")
does not prescribe, the pledged collateral mortgage note can prescribe."
Because the pledged obligation (the collateral mortgage note) can prescribe,
and because, normally, the pledged collateral mortgage note is a "demand"
instrument which normally prescribes in five years, careful lenders have debtors
acknowledge the collateral mortgage note every five years. Further, some
creditors even have documents allowing the creditor, as agent and attorney-in-
fact for the debtor, to acknowledge it for prescriptive purposes. In addition,
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5807 allows a mechanism for acknowledgement of
the collateral mortgage note if payment is made on the underlying obligation by
the debtor.25
The latest case to interpret Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5807 is Manuel Tire
Co. v. J. W. Herpin, Inc. 2 6  The case involved the pledge of a collateral
mortgage to secure an open account. The court held payment on the open
account was an interruption of prescription on the collateral mortgage note.
Careful attention should be paid to the language of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5807-only payment by "the debtor" or the "co-debtors in solido" will
interrupt prescription, not payment by any other person. Therefore, knowing
who has made the payment is important for a determination of whether
prescription has been interrupted. Since 1988 and the amendments to the
Louisiana Civil Code articles on suretyship, 7 a creditor who knows persons
122. La. R.S. 10:9-101 to :9-605 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
123. Succession of Picard, 238 La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959); Scott v. Corkem, 231 La. 368,
91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
124. Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1979); Succession of Picard, 238 La.
455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959); Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. H.P.B., Jr. Dev. Co., 427 So. 2d
486 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
125. La. R.S. 9:5807 (Supp. 1994) provides:
§ 5807. Interruption of prescription on pledged obligations by payment on obligation
secured by pledge
A payment by a debtor of interest or principal of an obligation shall constitute an
acknowledgement of all other obligations including promissory notes of such debtor or
his codebtors in solido pledged by the debtor or his codebtors in solido to secure the
obligation as to which payment is made. In all cases the party claiming an interruption
of prescription of such pledged obligation including a promissory note as a result of such
acknowledgement shall have the burden of proving all of the elements necessary to
establish the same. For purposes of this Section, a "pledged obligation" shall include any
obligation, including a promissory note, in which a security interest has been granted
under Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws or the corresponding provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in any other state, to the extent applicable.
126. 620 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
127. 1987 La. Acts No. 409, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988).
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are merely secondarily liable cannot treat them as solidary obligors, notwith-
standing language of "solidarity" in a continuing guaranty or the document."'
It is interesing to note that the collateral mortgage device probably came
into existence originally as a mechanism for financing open account lending.
The earliest cases on collateral mortgages, while cryptic, lead one to the
conclusion that what we term a "collateral mortgage package" was developed as
a way to secure a fluctuating line of credit directly to a borrower, or to secure
a surety's obligation to a lender who was giving open account credit to the
debtor. 29
VIII. BANKRUPTCY AND SECURITY DEVICES ISSUES
30
A discussion of the new Bankruptcy Code amendments 3' is beyond the
scope of this article. One important case for Louisiana lawyers, however, must
be noted. 32 BFP overrules Durrett.t 33
A. The ABC's of BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. 134
1. Introduction
Perhaps no other area of civil law presents as many clashes between federal
and state law as bankruptcy. The struggle between competing interests and
policies takes on many faces: federal versus state exemptions, rejection of
executory contracts and unexpired leases, recovery of payments as preferences,
the avoidance of security interests, foreclosure rights versus the automatic stay,
and characterization of rights under federal versus state law. One such clash is
the right of a bankruptcy trustee to recover the equity which may have been lost
by a debtor in a pre-petition foreclosure sale of the debtor's property under
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 35
128. La. Civ. Code art. 3037.
129. See, e.g., Levy v. Ford, 41 La. Ann. 873, 6 So. 671 (1889); Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Jamison, 25 La. Ann. 363 (1873); Succession of Dolhonde, 21 La. Ann. 3 (1869). Compare this
situation with Pickersgill & Co. v. Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297 (1852), a case often cited with respect to
the "future advance mortgage," but which case may involve what is now termed a collateral mortgage
package.
130. This portion of the article was derived from a paper and presentation made by Stephen P.
Strohschein and Michael H. Rubin to the American Bar Association, Business Law Committee and
Litigation/Bankruptcy Committee at the American Bar Association's Annual Meeting held in New
Orleans on August 8, 1994.
131. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106.
132. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
133. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
134. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
135. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 548(a) provides:
§548. Fraudulent transfers and obligations
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The policy behind Section 548 is clear-preservation (or recovery) of the
debtor's assets for the equitable distribution of that property to unsecured
creditors. Towards this end, Congress has enabled the trustee to look back at the
pre-petition activities of the debtor and recover property transferred either with
fraudulent intent under Section 548(a)(1) (intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud"
the creditors), or where the transfer was "constructively" fraudulent under
Section 548(a)(2). Section 548(a)(2) sets forth four elements required before a
transfer may be set aside:
(1) the transfer must be of property in which the debtor had an interest;
(2) the debtor must have been insolvent at the time of the transfer, or
have become insolvent as a result of the transfer;
(3) the transfer must have occurred within one year of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition; and,
(4) the transfer must have been for less than a "reasonably equivalent
value."
A competing policy is the protection of the rights of creditors lending money
secured by the property of the borrower. Although creditors rarely loan money
strictly for the right to foreclose upon the collateral obtained, most transactions
are dependent upon the creditor's assurance that, if payment is not made, there
is collateral that can be seized and sold to pay the debt. Indeed, for many
lenders subject to state or federal regulation, such as banks, making loans without
adequate collateral can lead to regulatory criticism.
Not only the right to foreclose upon collateral is important to the creditor.
The value of the foreclosure depends in large part upon the creditor being able
to quickly market and transfer the property to third persons, since most creditors
are in the business of lending money, not owning foreclosed property for
investment purposes. The creditor's ability to resell the property depends upon
obtaining valid title through the foreclosure process. The protection of lenders
who place their money at risk in loans secured by real estate and the related
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
(i) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such
transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in
business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was
an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would
be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
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issue of certainty of real estate titles are of vital importance to the economy,
although regulation of these rights largely has been within the dominion of the
states.
For at least fourteen years the federal courts have struggled with these
competing interests in the context of a trustee's right to recover the equity lost
by the debtor in a pre~petition foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court, in BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp.,3' has resolved the conflict in favor of the state's
interests in protecting creditors' foreclosure rights and the related concern
regarding certainty of title resulting from foreclosure sales.
2. The Conflicts Among the Courts of Appeals
At least three distinct approaches to Section 548(a)(2) were developed by the
courts of appeals from 1980 until BFP was decided. A review of their holdings
and rationale is appropriate to reach an understanding of the Supreme Court's
decision.
a. The "Durrett Rule"
- A trustee's right to avoid a foreclosure sale was first reviewed at the
appellate level by the Fifth Circuit in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance
Co.t 37  The case was decided under the precursor to Section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Section 67(d) of the Act. 38 Durrett involved the attack by
a bankruptcy trustee of a pre-petition foreclosure sale under a deed of trust. The
sale generated $115,400. The district court found the "fair market value" of the
property on the date of sale was $200,000. Thus the price paid at the foreclosure
sale was 57.7% of the fair market value.'
39
The language of Section 67(d) required a finding that the price paid was a
"fair equivalent" for the property, and the court's simple holding was that 57.7%
of the fair market value was not the "fair equivalent" for the transfer of the
property-a seemingly innocuous result. However, in support of its holding, the
court went on to state:
We have been unable to locate a decision of any district or
appellate court dealing only with a transfer of real property as the
subject of attack under section 67(d) of the Act, which has approved the
transfer for less than 70 percent of the market value of the property.140
136. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
137. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
138. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67, 30 Stat. 544, 564, as amended by Act of June 22, 1938,
Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
139. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203.
140. Id. The court went on to state:
Our review of the entire.evidence leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the
price [paid by Mitchell) was not a "fair equivalent" for the property. Under such
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Although this language appears to have been no more than an observation, a 70%
minimum foreclosure sale price soon became "codified" as the "Durrett Rule"
by the lower courts that chose to "follow" the decision."' The "Durrett Rule,"
however, was by no means a magical test."' Many cases citing and relying
upon Durrett realized that a case-by-case analysis was still required. Some cases
rejected a "bright line" rule of 70% in favor of a weighing of facts that included:
(1) the fair market value at the time of the sale versus the sales price; (2) the
nature of the property; (3) the relative marketability of the property; and (4) the
number of bidders appearing and bidding at the sale.t"3 Some courts that
followed Durrett even have noted that, in some cases, "no less than 100 percent
of the fair market value may be a reasonable price."' "
b. Madrid and the Irrebuttable Presumption
A result and approach that differed completely from Durrett emerged in the
Ninth Circuit, the circuit from which the controversy would ultimately be
resolved twelve years later. In In re Madrid,'4' the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel (BAP) was confronted with a pre-petition foreclosure sale under
a deed of trust that generated "64% to 67% of the property's market value at the
time of sale."'146  The BAP panel expressed the opinion that a distinction
should be made between private transfers by bankruptcy debtors and "regularly
conducted public sales." The panel stated: "We decline to follow Durrett's 70%
fair market value rule for the reason that a regularly conducted sale, open to all
bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of private transfers
to relatives and favorites." ' ' After reviewing the situations under which
circumstances, it is our duty to declare the transfer voidable under section 67(d).
Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 B.R. 818 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1983); Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 33 B.R. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
142. See In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 F.3d 1119, 1126 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993):
In Durret we held that receipt of 57.4% of the consideration given could not constitute
reasonably equivalent value, but implied in dictum that receipt of 70% might constitute
such value. Many bankruptcy courts have construed Durrett as espousing a mechanical
test with a 70% cut-off point, although this is clearly incorrect. Other circuits have
rejected any mechanical test to ascertain the lower limit of reasonably equivalent value,
opting instead for a "totality of the circumstances" approach.
(citations omitted).
143. See, e.g., Christian v. Ryan (In re Christian), 48 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); Hoffman
v. Heritage Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Garrison), 48 B.R. 837 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
144. Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 B.R. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982).
145. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982),
affd sub nom. Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
833, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984).
146. Id. at 425.
147. Id. at 426-27.
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foreclosure sales would be upset under state law, and observing that the mere
inadequacy of price was insufficient, the panel held:
The law of foreclosure should be harmonized with the law of
fraudulent conveyances. Compatible results can be obtained by constru-
ing the reasonably equivalent value requirement of Code § 548(a)(2) to
mean the same as the consideration received at a non-collusive and
regularly conducted foreclosure sale. Thus, in the absence of defects,
such foreclosure withstands avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance. 4"
Although the panel decision was appealed, the Ninth Circuit held the transfer
of the debtor's property interest occurred at the time the deed of trust was
granted, not at the time of the foreclosure sale. 49 As a result, the court found
the transfer occurred more than one year prior to the debtor's bankruptcy filing
and, therefore, was not avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance.50 Although it
affirmed the panel decision, the Ninth Circuit's failure to adopt the reasoning of
the panel perhaps caused more delay in the ultimate resolution of the dispute
than might otherwise have been experienced.
c. The Bundles "Middle Ground"
A third position was taken by the Seventh Circuit in In re Bundles.' In this
case the debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition two weeks after the sheriff's sale of his
home. The value of the home was stipulated to be $15,500 at the time of the sale;
the property was sold for $5,066.80, or approximately 33% of its value. The
Seventh Circuit criticized the Madrid approach of deference to state law: "[W]e
must reject the view that state law, either directly or as the federal rule of decision,
should determine the outcome of a bankrupt's complaint under section
548(a)(2)(A). Here, Congress has set forth a federal standard."'52 The court was
also critical of supplanting a statutory analysis with "policy considerations":
148. Id. at 427.
149. Congress effectively, if not intentionally, overruled the Ninth Circuit's holding in In re
Madrid in the 1984 BAFJA amendments. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 421(i), 98 Stat. 333, 368 (1984). The definition of transfer was
expanded to include the "foreclosures upon the debtor's equity of redemption." ld. The impact of
this amendment upon the controversy has itself been controversial and subject to differing
interpretations. For example, see footnote 7 of the majority opinion in BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp., as compared to footnote 8 of the dissent's opinion. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S.
Ct. 1757, 1764 n.7, 1770 n.8 (1994).
150. Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. (in re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 833. 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984).
151. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988). Although Bundles is given
more attention as the genesis of the "middle ground" approach, the Eighth Circuit reached a similar
result four years earlier in First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984).
152. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 822.
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It is beyond our scope of review to consider the policy implications of
permitting the debtor to set aside the foreclosure of his home. Any change
deemed desirable on policy grounds should be addressed to Congress
rather than to this court. Our duty is simply to interpret the language of
the statute.1
3
Noting that an irrebuttable presumption in favor of foreclosure sales would
create, in effect, an exception where there was none, and that adoption of the state
law would create a test of "good faith" where there was none, the Seventh Circuit
concluded "section 548(a)(2)(A) esiablishes a federal basis-independent of state
law-for setting aside a foreclosure sale."'
15 4
The Seventh Circuit then turned its attention to what the federal standard
should be. After discussing the difficulties interpreting the phrase "reasonably
equivalent value," the court stated:
If anything is clear from the various uses of the word "value" in the Code,
it is that Congress did not mean fair market value when it used the term
reasonably equivalent value. On the other hand, Congress' conscious use
of a federal standard suggests that it did not believe that the expedient of
relying entirely on state foreclosure law would protect adequately federal
interests.155
Thus, the Seventh Circuit found the correct result to be somewhere between a
Durrett dependence on fair market value and a Madrid reliance upon state law and
policy. The middle ground it found was in a case-by-case analysis:
In our view, in defining reasonably equivalent value, the court should
neither grant a conclusive presumption in favor of a purchaser at a
regularly conducted, non-collusive foreclosure sale, nor limit its inquiry
to a simple comparison of the sale price to the fair market value.
Reasonable equivalence should depend on all the facts of each case.3 6
The analysis, according to the Seventh Circuit, may begin with consideration
of the fair market value as a "starting point," but the court also should not lose
focus of the impact of the context, that is the foreclosure, suggesting perhaps a
"rebuttable" presumption in favor of the foreclosure sale is appropriate. The
presumption could be rebutted by evidence regarding the "totality" of the transac-
tion-suggesting the procedures used should be "calculated" to "return to the
debtor-mortgagor his equity in the property" and also directing the bankruptcy
courts to "consider such factors as whether there was a fair appraisal of the
153. Id. at 823 (citations omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 824.
156. Id.
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property, whether the property was advertised widely, and whether competitive
bidding was encouraged.'"
The Eleventh Circuit, in In re Littleton 58 and In re Grissom,'5 9 followed
the Bundles analysis, holding foreclosure sales were entitled to a presumption that
the reasonably equivalent value was achieved but the bankruptcy courts should
review the totality of the circumstances when the presumption was challenged.
Other circuits also chose to follow Bundles, which became the "majority" view
among the courts of appeals, and probably the lower courts as well. t1°
B. BFP-Resolution of the Controversy
Against this backdrop of various disputes among the circuits, the BFP case
began working its way up the appellate ranks within the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had not considered the issue since its decision in Madrid.
1. BFP in the Lower Courts
Though arising from a convoluted factual and procedural morass, simply put
the facts of BFP are as follows. BFP was a partnership formed to purchase a
beachfront residence in California. The purchase was financed in part by a loan
from Imperial Savings and Loan Association (Imperial), which took a first deed of
trust against the home in the amount of $356,250, and by a second deed of trust in
favor of the vendor of the property in the amount of $200,000. Upon a later default
in the payments, Imperial instituted foreclosure proceedings and the property was
sold to a third person for $433,000. A few months later, BFP filed for relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and also filed an adversary proceeding seeking
to avoid the foreclosure sale as not having been for the reasonably equivalent value.
BFP alleged the property was worth over $700,000 at the time of the sale.' 6'
157. Id. The Seventh Circuit's reasoning may have reflected a "middle of the road" analysis
between Durrett and Madrid, but the ultimate implementation of that approach may have led to a far
greater intrusion into state law foreclosure procedures. Few state foreclosure laws are designed to
prolect a debtor's equity. Across the country many state procedures, it appears, seem designed only
to give the minimal due process necessary to debtors in order to grant the creditors relief. In many
states, foreclosing creditors would have been required routinely to go to much greater lengths to
protect their foreclosure sales from attack under Bundles than the 70% bid required by Durrett. For
an overview of state laws, see Baxter Dunaway, The Law of Distressed Real Estate (1991).
158. Walker v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 888 F.2d 90 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
159. Grissom v. Johnson (In re Grissom), 955 F.2d 1440 (1lth Cir. 1992).
160. See, e.g., Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1991);
Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.), 914 F.2d 458 (4th
Cir. 1990).
161. BFP v. Imperial Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 132 B.R. 748. 749-50 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1991), affd, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992), affd Sub nom. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S.
Ct. 1757 (1994).
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The bankruptcy court granted Imperial's motion for summary judgment on the
basis of Madrid, finding the "reasonably equivalent value was received at the
foreclosure sale and that the foreclosure sale was 'regularly conducted."" 6 2 On
appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the majority opinion affirmed the
decision of the bankruptcy court and reaffirmed the rationale of Madrid with little
new analysis, 63 despite the immense body of law which had arisen between the
earlier Madrid decision and the instant case.'
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,' 65 the panel of the court of appeals noted the
issue was a "close one."'" Reviewing the positions of the courts under Madrid,
Durrett, and Bundles, the panel expressed difficulty in deciding between the
irrebuttable presumption in Madrid and the rebuttable presumption in Bundles. The
court concluded:
The Bundles analysis (and implicitly that of the Durrett approach)
rests on a plain-language interpretation of § 548(a)(2). Granting an
irrebuttable presumption of reasonable equivalence under a noncollusive
foreclosure sale, the Bundles court argues, effectively creates a judicial
exception to the trustee's avoiding powers under § 548. In turn, an
irrebuttable presumption undermines the ability of the trustee or debtor to
recover lost equity, which is the purpose of the § 548 avoiding powers.
The position is persuasive, but we think that broader considerations
require a different result.6 7
The "broader considerations" discussed by the Ninth Circuit were the same
concerns expressed by the other courts following Madrid-the stability of mortgage
foreclosures and the resulting impact on real estate title issues. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit adopted the bankruptcy appellate panel's Madrid approach as its own.
2. The Supreme Court
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit's observation that the issue was a "close one" was
prophetic of how the Supreme Court would decide the issue when BFP came before
it. In a 5-4 decision,' Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision.
162. id. at 749.
163. Id. at 750-51.
164. The dissenting opinion by Judge Volinn noted the "substantial body of case law" that had
developed in this context and noted his support of a Bundles analysis. Id. at 751-52 (Volinn, J.,
dissenting).
165. BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992), affd sub
nom. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
166. id. at 1148.
167. Id. (citation omitted).
168. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
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The majority opinion was accompanied by a sharply worded dissent by Justice
Souter, who was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg.
a. The Majority Opinion
After reviewing the facts, the statutory provision, and the splits among the
courts of appeals, Justice Scalia began his analysis of the phrase "reasonably
equivalent value" with an examination of the relevance of "fair market value" in the
context of a foreclosure sale. He noted both Durrett and Bundles adopted fair
market value as the benchmark for considering whether the reasonably equivalent
value was given, whereas the Bankruptcy Code failed to use fair market value as
the benchmark in Section 548(a)(2)(A), despite its use elsewhere within the
Bankruptcy Code.
Section 548, on the other hand, seemingly goes out of its way to avoid that
standard term ["fair market value"]. It might readily have said "receives
less than fair market value in exchange for such transfer obligation," or
perhaps "less than a reasonable equivalent of fair market value." Instead,
it used the (as far as we are aware) entirely novel phrase "reasonably
equivalent value."'
169
Noting that Congress did not dictate the use of a fair market value analysis, and
opining that, factually, foreclosure sales are the "antithesis" of a fair market, Justice
Scalia concluded "[m]arket value cannot be the criterion of equivalence in the
foreclosure-sale context."
170
Justice Scalia next reviewed the possibility of deciphering a "fair" foreclosure
sale price, as opposed to a fair market price, and pronounced it "another artificially
constructed criterion.".'7' Noting each state has its own laws regulating foreclo-
sure procedure, he found the adoption of a federal standard for a fair foreclosure
price to be too intrusive into the realm of state law. "To specify a federal
'reasonable' foreclosure-sale price is to extend federal bankruptcy law well beyond
the traditional field of fraudulent transfers, into realms of policy where it has not
ventured before. Some sense of history is needed to appreciate this.' '72
Justice Scalia engaged in a lengthy discussion of the history of fraudulent
conveyance law and the history of foreclosure remedies, noting the two have
"enjoyed over 400 years of peaceful coexistence in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence,"'73 or at least until Durrett. The historical analysis closed with reflections
on the importance of certainty of title to the "general welfare of society', 74 and
169. Id. at 1761.
170. Id. at 1761-62.
171. id. at 1762.
172. Id. at 1763.
173. Id. at 1764.
174. id. (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 60, 31 S. Ct. 200, 204 (1911)).
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with a caveat that any other decision would place "every piece of realty purchased
at foreclosure ... under a federally created cloud." '  The majority concluded:
"a fair and proper price, or a 'reasonably equivalent value,' for foreclosed property,
is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements
of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with.' 7 6
b. The Dissent
The dissent began its critique of the majority decision by characterizing the
majority's holding as allowing a "peppercorn paid at a... foreclosure sale to be
treated as the 'reasonably equivalent' value of a California beachfront estate."
Furthermore, this was being done, according to the dissent, in derogation of the
plain language of the Bankruptcy Code.177 With regard to the statutory language,
the dissent pointedly argued:
[A]n ordinary speaker of English would have no difficulty grasping its
basic thrust: the bankruptcy court must compare the price received by the
insolvent debtor and the worth of the item when sold and set aside the
transfer if the former was substantially ("[un]reasonabl[y]") "less than"
the latter. Nor would any ordinary English speaker, concerned to
determine whether a foreclosure sale was collusive or procedurally
irregular (an enquiry going exclusively to the process by which a
transaction was consummated), direct an adjudicator, as the Court now
holds Congress did, to ascertain whether the sale had realized "less than
a reasonably equivalent value" (an enquiry described in quintessentially
substantive terms).7 8
The dissent also looked to the "text, structure, and history" of Section
548(a)(2)(A) to support the "soundness of the plain reading," being particularly
persuaded by the 1984 BAFJA amendments expanding the definition of transfer to
include "involuntary" transfers and the "foreclosure on the debtor's equity of
redemption." '79
Justice Souter argued: "If a property's 'value' is conclusively presumed to be
whatever it sold for, the 'less than reasonabl[e] equivalen[cel' question will never
be worth asking, and the bankruptcy avoidance power will apparently be a dead
letter in reviewing real estate foreclosures."' 8 Instead, contended Justice Souter,
the bankruptcy courts should be allowed to analyze what is "reasonably equivalent
175. Id. at 1765.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1767 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1768-69 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
179. Id. at 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting). See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-355, §§ 421(i), 463(a)(1), 98 Stat. 368, 378 (1984).
180. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757. 1770 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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value" as they do under other Section 548(a)(2) cases. He contended that not only
does this plain reading of the statute not lead to an absurd result, the plain reading
fulfills the policy of recovery of lost equity for all of the creditors of the estate.
With regard to the "important" state interests of the stability of real estate titles, the
dissent refers this policy consideration to Congress. Justice Souter examined the
Supreme Court's previous decisions and found no burden had been placed upon
Congress to adopt clearer language than was present in Section 548(a)(2) in order
to override these state interests. Thus, the dissent concluded that the Court's
"obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it. Doing that in this case
would produce no frustration or absurdity, but quite the opposite." " '
c. The Majority's Rebuttal
The majority took the opportunity to respond to the dissent within its opinion.
Stating it had no problem with giving the statute its "plain meaning," the majority
chided the dissent for failing to answer the ultimate question: "What is aforeclosed
property worth ?,,l82 Other than stating that the bankruptcy courts are capable of
undertaking the task of determining the issue, the majority stated that the dissent
failed to give any guidance regarding what "value" received in a foreclosure sale
is "reasonably equivalent."
Concerning the dissent's argument that it was creating an exception to Section
548(a)(2)(A), Justice Scalia responded that the consideration regarding foreclosure
sales and other transfers was still the same, but the context within which the
decision is made requires a different factual analysis:
[F]oreclosure has the effect of completely redefining the market in which
the property is offered for sale; normal free-market rules of exchange are
replaced by the far more restrictive rules governing forced sales. Given
this altered reality, and the concomitant inutility of the normal tool for
determining what property is worth (fair market value), the only legitimate
evidence of the property's value at the time it is sold is the foreclosure
sale price itself.1
8 3
C. Unresolved Issues
BFP is not a pure and unequivocal win for creditors. It does not validate
every foreclosure sale, whether by judicial process or otherwise. Rather, the only
type of sale BFP expressly covers are "non-collusive real estate mortgage
foreclosure sales conducted in conformance with applicable state law." Thus,
several issues are potentially ripe for attack by debtors/trustees under BFP:
181. Id. at 1778 (Souter, I., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1766.
183. Id. at 1767.
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(1) Was it a "real estate mortgage foreclosure sale"?
(2) Was the sale "non-collusive"?
(3) Was the sale "conducted in conformance with applicable state
law"?
(4) Was the mortgagee the successful bidder?
1. Non-Real Estate Foreclosure Sales
At footnote 3 of the majority's opinion, Justice Scalia "emphasized" the
opinion covered "only mortgage foreclosures of real estate," stating, "[t]he
considerations bearing upon other foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax
liens, for example) may be different."' 84 Indeed, given the importance placed
by the majority on giving deference to the "important state interests" regarding
regulation of foreclosures and the certainty of real estate title, it is not difficult
to envision a different result in a non-real estate context. Certainly, some of the
arguments would be as applicable in the context of foreclosure sales of movables
as they are in foreclosure sales of real estate. It can be argued that a "redefini-
tion" of the market occurs with foreclosure sales of chattels, just as Justice Scalia
noted it did with sales of real estate. This fact, however, ultimately may not be
determinative if the sanctity of land titles is deemed to be the overriding local
issue. Given the close vote in BFP, it is possible a case involving chattels only'
would lead to a different result.
Also, the Court does not answer the following scenarios which, although not
involving solely real estate, involve similar issues of "value" and state law
procedures:
(1) What about foreclosures on mixed assets, such as real estate, leases,
equipment, goods, inventory, and accounts receivable, particularly in
states where there is a "one action" rule under which a creditor cannot
proceed separately against the assets. If they are all included in the
same action, then it is not solely a real estate case. Will BFP's
protection apply?
(2) Consider also, foreclosure on collateral where it is not clear under
state law whether the property is "real estate." Specifically, many states
have varied and uneven approaches to leases. Are they purely real
estate related, are they purely contractual, or are they mixed use? How
is the BFP analysis to be applied on lease foreclosures? Further, when
there are leases involved, frequently the lender puts a receiver in place.
The receiver's actions can have an impact on the property's value. Will
the receiver's actions, which may or may not be attributable to the
foreclosing creditor, play into a "non-collusive" analysis?
184. Id. at 1761 n.3.
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(3) Finally, consider items that are subject to U.C.C. Article 9. There
are many situations in which there is foreclosure, or taking in the nature
of foreclosure, under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Although these are not strictly real estate, and in many cases occur
through private sales, the "non-collusive" use of "state law procedures"
may be involved. Is there any protection for creditors under BFP?
2. "Cellusive" Foreclosure Sales
When addressing the argument that the majority's opinion rendered Section
548 superfluous in the context of foreclosure sales, Justice Scalia described how
it would continue to be used. According to Justice Scalia, Section 548(a)(1) will
be applicable in the context of collusive foreclosure sales. 185 Section 548(a)(1)
authorizes the avoidance of transfers "made ... with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud."' 86 Is there an opportunity to find "collusion" outside of the
intentional fraud elements of Section 548(a)(1)? Or put another way, could there
be situations deemed "constructively collusive"?
The term "non-collusive" sale was not defined by the majority. Whether a
sale is "non-collusive" may thus become a mixture of both state law and federal
law. If the federal preemption rules of the Bankruptcy Code apply, then
theoretically a bankruptcy court may separately evaluate whether a sale that state
law would otherwise approve might nevertheless be considered "collusive" for
terms of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, what would a bankruptcy court
deem the following:
(1) A private sale in strict foreclosure all in accordance with applicable
state law where all notices are given, but the only bidder is the creditor.
(2) A private foreclosure sale in the nature of strict foreclosure under
state law where all appropriate notices are given and the only bidder is
the creditor. The debt is $1,000,000, and the property is bid in for
$200,000 (allowing the creditor to obtain an $800,000 deficiency
judgment) and the creditor then turns around and sells the property the
same day for $600,000.
(3) A judicial foreclosure sale in which notices are published in local
newspapers, although the property is a clearly major commercial
property, and notices are not published in the applicable national
journals (such as the Wall Street Journal or other national publications).
The debtor can prove that if the publication had occurred more broadly,
although not required by state law, there would have been other bidders
at the sale.
185. Id. at 1765.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988).
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(4) Foreclosure in accordance with state law, where a potential bidder
approaches the lender prior to the sale. The lender asks the bidder not
to bid at the sale (to avoid increasing the costs of the sale) but agrees
to cut a separate deal with the bidder after the fact.
3. "Irregular" Foreclosure Sales
If not intentionally fraudulent, the trustee would be required to allege the
sale "fail[ed] to comply with all governing state laws."' 7 Should there be an
emphasis upon the word all in this quote? It is not emphasized in the opinion,
but it remains to be seen how strict the courts will be. In partial reply, Justice
Scalia wrote:
Any irregularity in the conduct of the sale that would permit judicial
invalidation of the sale under applicable state law deprives the sale price
of its conclusive force under § 548(a)(2)(A), and the transfer may be
avoided if the price received -was not reasonably equivalent to the
property's actual value at the time of the sale (which we think would
be the price that would have been received if the foreclosure sale had
proceeded according to law).' 88
Thus, in order for the irregularity to form the basis for a complaint by the trustee
under Section 548(a)(2)(A), it must be an irregularity that would invalidate the
sale under the appropriate state law.
The Court also noted, under some state foreclosure laws, sales may be set
aside if the price achieved was so low as to "shock the conscience." What if
there is no such threshold in a particular state? Will there be no "federal
conscience"? Are there no situations within which bankruptcy courts will be
permitted to develop their own interpretations of what state law is or should be?
Invalidation of a sale under some state laws, however, may be due to
procedural errors (e.g., the debtor or others had actual notice of the sale but the
notice did not comply with state timing rules or wording rules) or substantive
ones. An initial question may be whether it matters if the state law defect was
procedural or substantive. This was an issue the majority opinion addressed only
in passing. In footnote 5, the majority took issue with the dissent's characteriza-
tion of state foreclosure law as "merely procedural."' 8
187. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1765 (1994) (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 1765.
189. Id. at 1762 n.5. Footnote 5 reads, in pertinent part:
The dissent characterizes foreclosure rules as "merely procedural," and asserts that this
renders them, unlike "substantive" zoning regulations, irrelevant in bankruptcy. We are
not sure we agree with the characterization. But in any event, the cases relied on for this
distinction all address creditors' attempts to claim the benefit of state rules of law
(whether procedural or substantive) as property rights, in a bankruptcy proceeding. None
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If there is an irregularity that would invalidate the sale, would a court find
the Trustee has the option of invalidating the sale and all further transactions
under state law, of seeking damages or recompense from the creditor (using what
measure of damages?), or of one or more combinations of remedies? Does the
BFP language limit the trustee's recovery to the amount that would have been
received at the foreclosure sale had the sale been appropriately handled? Section
550 states that when a trustee avoids a transfer under Section 548, the trustee
may recover "the property transferred, or, -if the court so orders, the value of
such property."'9 Section 550 does not say the "fair market value." Should
bankruptcy courts order that the "value" recoverable be only the difference
between what was received at the sale and what would have been received if the
sale had been appropriately conducted? It does not appear Justice Scalia was
placing such a cap upon the recovery. The language appears to have been
intended more to reveal the continued viability of Justice Scalia's "neologism,"
not the expression of an opinion regarding the trustee's theoretical recovery-but,
the question remains.
4. Purchasing Mortgagees
BFP involved a third party bidder being made a defendant by the trustee for
the avoidance of the foreclosure sale. In many foreclosure sales the mortgagee,
rather than a third party, takes title to the property and then attempts to sell that
property. Few if any foreclosing creditors seek to retain the foreclosed property
for investment purposes. Indeed, federal rules regulating banks and those dealing
with lender liability in the environmental field favor a quick resale. The credit
required to be given to the borrower from that sale varies from state to state.
Would a mortgagee's purchase of the property change the analysis? It did for
the district court in In re Bundles.'9' That court found the irrebuttable
presumption in favor of foreclosure sales was only applicable when a third party
was the successful bidder. However, an exception running against mortgagees
appears to be contrary to the BFP majority's opinion, which directs bankruptcy
courts to state law.
A difference in results, depending upon who the successful bidder was, will
certainly be appropriate where state law provides a different result. Additionally,
a mortgagee's purchase of the collateral may very likely continue, to be an
important factor as courts examine the issues which are left open under BFP.
of them declares or even intimates that state laws, procedural or otherwise, are irrelevant
to prebankruptcy valuation questions such as that presented by § 548(a)(2)(A).
Id. (citations omitted).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
191. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 78 B.R. 203 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1987), rev'd, 856 F.2d
815 (7th Cir. 1988).
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D. Conclusion on BFP
In an area of law that causes creditors so much "consternation" (in addition
to pure economic loss), and where what makes normal commercial sense often
seems to backfire, BFP represents some hope that in pure real estate foreclosure
sales, one need only take those familiar steps dictated by state law and no harm
will occur by a later bankruptcy filing. No doubt trustees and debtors will
heighten their attention to state foreclosure procedures, and bankruptcy courts
may be tempted to fashion new interpretations of state law-both actions
endangering the "safe harbor" created by BFP. But in all events, the decision
gives creditors either (1) something less to worry about or (2) something more
to argue about in the event of an attack under Section 548(a)(2).
IX. SURETYSHIP AND CONTINUING GUARANTEES
Litigation involving guarantees and suretyship has been greatly diminished
since the 1988 revisions to the Louisiana Civil Code- articles on suretyship. 92
This is true partly because the confusion caused by some of the earlier jurispru-
dence'93 has been abolished by Article 3037, which provides that if a creditor
knows the true relationship of the parties, the creditor cannot treat someone who
is "ostensibly" bound as a principal as anything other than a surety. 94
Therefore, "solidarity" language in a continuing guaranty will not allow the
creditor to treat the guarantor as a solidary obligor; rather, the rules of suretyship
apply. Even among solidary obligors, rules of suretyship can apply "if the
circumstances giving rise to the solidary obligation concern only one of the
obligors."'
9
Normally, the release of a surety has no impact on the principal debtor but
does release the co-sureties for the right of contribution to the extent the right of
contribution has been impaired. The general rules are contained in Article 1892.
Remission of the debt of the principal obligor releases the surety because the
principal obligation has been extinguished. On the other hand, remission of the
debt to the surety does not release the principal obligor because the principal
obligor at all times remains bound. Finally, remission of a debt granted to one
surety "releases the other sureties only to the extent of contribution the other
sureties might have recovered from the surety to whom the remission was
granted."' 96 This right, however, may be waived by express language in the
contract. That was the holding in First National Bank v. Green Garden
192. 1987 La. Acts No. 409, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988).
193. See, e.g., Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979);
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975).
194. La. Civ. Code art. 3037.
195. La. Civ. Code art. 1804.
196. La. Civ. Code art. 1892.
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Processing Co., 97 which was relied upon recently in FDIC v. Gilbert.'98  If
there is language in the contract in which the surety agrees to be bound,
notwithstanding the release of other sureties, then a lender can settle with one
surety without losing rights against another.' 99
It is important to note the "extent of contribution" referred to in Article 1892
is not necessarily easily ascertainable. For example, assume a situation in which
Debtor is the maker of a note for $120,000. There are three sureties who all
signed the same continuing guaranty, SI, S2, and S3. Assume that the creditor
has released SI for $10,000. In this situation, the $10,000 would be attributed
to the principal obligation ($120,000) and Debtor would still be liable for the
remaining $110,000.
On the other hand, the release granted to Si would release S2 and S3 "only
to the extent of the contribution the other sureties might have recovered from the
surety to whom the remission was granted." 20° Assuming the sureties were
liable for one-third each, then the release of SI would release Si's virile share
(one-third), thereby reducing the right of contribution (since the original debt was
for $120,000) by that $40,000. Therefore, of the $110,000 that is outstanding
now on the principal obligation ($120,000 minus the $10,000 payment), sureties
S2 and S3 should be liable only for the principal obligation minus the virile share
of S1, for a total of $80,000 (principal obligation of $120,000 minus the $40,000
virile share of Si). Therefore, the lender could collect $110,000 from Debtor,
or $80,000 from S2, or $80,000 from S3.
On the other hand, it may be the virile share is not one-third. Under Article
3055, it is possible parol evidence could be used to show the parties were to be
bound in a different fashion. Article 3055 provides:
Co-sureties are those who are sureties for the same obligation of the
same obligor. They are presumed to share the burden of the principal
obligation in proportion to their number unless the parties agreed
otherwise or contemplated that he who bound himself first would bear
the entire burden of the obligation regardless of others who thereafter
bind themselves independently of and in reliance upon the obligation of
the former."0'
197. 387 So. 2d 1070 (La. 1980).
198. 9 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1993).
199. Although FDIC v. Gilbert involved co-makers, not guarantors, the rationale is the same-a
release of one co-maker should not release the other if the remaining co-maker has agreed to be
bound nonetheless. This is different than releasing all of the co-makers, in which case the principal
obligation would be extinguished by confusion. La. Civ. Code arts. 1903-1904.
200. La. Civ. Code art. 1892.
201. Comment (b) to Article 3055 explains:
The presumption provided in this Article is rebuttable. Parol evidence is admissible to
overcome the presumption and to show that the sureties agreed among themselves that
liability would be proportionately shared or that certain sureties were induced to make
their contract with the understanding that others would entirely bear the burden.
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If S] had signed the continuing guaranty at a time when he was 100% owner
of Debtor and later sold a one (1%) percent stock interest to S2 and one (1%)
percent stock interest to S3, both of whom were then required to sign the
continuing guaranty, it might be argued Si's virile share is 98%. In such an
instance, it may well be that the release of SI for $10,000, although it has no
impact on Debtor's liability (Debtor would remain liable for $110,000) would
have released.98% of the obligation as to S2 and S3 because that would have
been the extent of the impairment of contribution rights. This makes it important
that a creditor at least get a representation from the surety being released of that
surety's virile share. Even more preferable from a creditor's standpoint is to
have language stating that the release of a surety or the impairment of subroga-
tion rights does not release co-sureties at all.

